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The discipline of international relations is divided by competing conceptions 
of change. International relations formed as a modern discipline in response to 
humanity’s growing destructiveness as monarchs, states and societies repeatedly 
went to war with each other. Twentieth-century scholarship in international 
relations grew up alongside a hopeful project embodied in an international 
movement: that if subjected to rational research and the close attention of 
concerned citizens, inter-state relations could be prevented from descending 
into the carnage of another world war.1
The interwar years (1919–39) became the crucible in which this project was 
tested. Internationalism grew apace as a genuinely transnational movement, 
with the development of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK), the 
Council on Foreign Relations (US), the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, the Institute of Pacific Affairs, and a range of like-minded institutions 
in many countries. Scholars such as James Bryce (1922), Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson (1926), William Dunning (1923), Harold Laski (1935), Philip Marshall 
Brown (1923), Frederick Sherwood Dunn (1937), Thomas Lawrence (1919) 
and Sir Alfred Zimmern (1936) produced studies into the causes of war and 
international friction, and the prospects for these to be blunted by international 
law, international organisation, and the evolution of ethical forms of international 
thought. For a time, the combination of scholarship and activism appeared to 
be bearing fruit, with the formation of the League of Nations, the signing of the 
Kellogg–Briand Pact, and the drawdown of military arsenals in North America 
and Europe.
The problem was that Japan’s Showa nationalists, Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin 
were not seized with such optimism. As Japanese, Italian, German and Soviet 
expansionism brought the world again to the brink of war, the occupant of 
the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Relations at the University of 
Aberystwyth, EH Carr, published a trenchant critique of the idealist movement 
1  Although modern international relations writing can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century (see 
Schmidt 1998) it is generally accepted that international relations coalesced as a self-conscious discipline after 
World War I, symbolised by the establishment of the first university chair in international relations at the 
University of Aberystwyth in 1919.
Change!
44
in international relations under the title The twenty years’ crisis (1939). Joined on 
the other side of the Atlantic in 1946 by Hans Morgenthau’s publication of 
Scientific man versus power politics, a burgeoning movement of ‘realist’ critique 
condemned utopian liberal scholarship for being overly prescriptive in its 
analysis, flawed in its basic understandings of human nature, and naive in its 
policy prescriptions. A clear implication of the realist critique was that idealism 
ironically makes war more, not less, likely.
International relations consolidated as a discipline after World War II, deeply 
divided by what came to be called its first great debate. Arguably, however, 
the idealist–realist divide continues as the major schism in the discipline, 
reproduced anew with each generation of scholars and each expansion of the 
discipline into new countries, because each side of the schism embodies a 
concept of change in international relations that is fundamentally incompatible 
with that of the other side. The two alternative conceptions of change can be 
termed ‘teleology’ and ‘cyclicality’. More recently, a third conception of change 
has emerged, borrowing heavily from institutional analysis in political science, 
which can be called ‘episodism’.
Teleology
The teleological conception of international relations is convinced that 
international relations can evolve and has evolved over time into more 
sophisticated, rational and just forms of relations. Scholars in this tradition 
point to a variety of data to support this conviction. The past century has 
seen, for example, an unprecedented proliferation of international institutions 
charged with regularising international relations and taming the excesses 
of power politics (Krasner 1983, Ruggie 1993). The occurrence of major war 
between states is in steady decline (Mueller 2004), although the bestiality of 
conflicts within states continues to climb (Rummel 1994). Transnational trade, 
investment and prosperity continue to rise, making sustained conflict simply 
too costly for states to contemplate (Rosecrance 1986). The great and bloody 
ideological contests of the past have been resolved (Fukuyama 1989). The spread 
of democracy and growth of conceptions of justice have tamed the ravages of 
power politics (Doyle 1986, Beitz 1979). The combination of technology, travel 
and transnational culture has bred a situation in which hostility between 
peoples has become unthinkable (Deutsch 1949, Cooper 1998).
At the base of the teleological conception is a profound belief in the power of 
rational human agency to alter the irrational outcomes of international relations. 
Ultimately, international relations is about the interaction of human beings, and 
as a result of this the closed system of states inevitably evolves into a more 
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predictable and stable society of states based on shared norms, objectives and 
expectations (Bull 1977). For some writers in this tradition, rationality and 
progress are injected into the affairs of states by harnessing the cold reason 
of human interests to overwhelm the irrational passions of relations among 
societies (Mitrany 1943, Haas 1964). Others argue that international relations 
are driven by intellectual constructs, and thus progress is provided by changing 
the content and expectations of those constructs (Ashley 1984, Walker 1993). 
Teleological approaches to international relations can be divided into liberal 
and critical variants. For liberals, progress in international relations results from 
the slow triumph of human interests over human passions, of material concerns 
over emotive drives. To liberal writers in international relations, all that is 
required is for the same concerns that underpin stable and prosperous domestic 
societies to be unfettered and allowed to construct a stable and prosperous 
international society (Keohane and Milner 1996, Moravcsik 1997). If allowed 
free play, rationality will free states from self-defeating, zero-sum conceptions 
of their interests, enabling them to develop positive-sum outcomes. Ultimately, 
long-run liberal international orders will foster liberal rationality within states, 
as they realise the benefits that arise from stability and liberal norms justify 
their own contributions to the perpetuation of the liberal order (Keohane 1984).
Critical variants of the teleological school are united by their conviction that 
scholarship and practice in international relations are mutually reinforcing. 
Any writer’s perspective on world affairs derives from his or her preferences for 
and interests in the way the world works—or does not (Cox 1981). Typically, 
critical writers take aim at conservative or liberal conceptions of international 
relations, arguing that such frameworks provide intellectual justification 
for particular power orders or economic orders, which in turn reward their 
intellectual defenders. To critical writers, it is the task of international relations 
to expose the workings of the power and economic orders and their intellectual 
superstructures, making the act of international relations scholarship an 
emancipatory project. In stripping away the intellectual garb of the workings of 
the current order, critical writers intend to expose the inequities and injustices 
of the current system, as a first step to changing that system. In this conception, 
human agency in the evolution of international relations is refined down to the 
international relations scholar him/herself as the radical agent of change.
To the teleological view of international relations, change is progressive and 
unidirectional. It may alternate between periods of slower and faster evolution, 
but in general the thought of international affairs reverting to the instability, 
hatreds and hierarchies of a century ago is as ludicrous as believing in a 
return to the era of monarchs, empires and European supremacy. International 
relations has moved on from the issues that preoccupied the internationalists of 
the interwar years, and is focused on new global challenges, many of which are 
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the product of the unprecedented period of peace and prosperity following the 
end of World War II. Old problems of national hatreds, ideological rivalry and 
zero-sum conflict are now found only in the margins of world politics, and can 
be eradicated there through the injection of evolutionary statecraft as surely 
as medieval diseases can be wiped out through the introduction of modern 
medicine. The future may not be as colourful as the past, but it will be safer, 
more prosperous, more just, and more sustainable (Fukuyama 1992).
Cyclicality
The cyclical conception of international relations is deeply sceptical of the 
claims of the teleological conception. Writers in the cyclical vein argue that 
all of the optimistic portents of positive evolution paraded by the teleologists 
are largely surface dressing, while the deep rationality of relations between 
societies remains much the same as it was at the dawn of recorded history. We 
have seen periods of peace and prosperity before, they point out, which usually 
come to an end in a catastrophic conflict that resets the basic ordering of power 
in the world. The last period of globalist euphoria ended in the slaughter of 
World War  I. Sovereignty is not being quietly superseded by transnational 
flows of money, goods, people and ideas; rather, the state is quietly extending 
its tentacles into ever broader areas of national life (Weiss 1998). Neither are 
states ceasing to invest in ever more destructive weapons systems (Ball 1993). 
International organisations are not curbing national rivalries; they are the new 
vehicles for rivalry (Grieco 1990, Mearsheimer 1994). Democracy, technology 
and education have not eradicated passions so much as turbocharged them 
(Kagan 2008). The end of ideological contestation has not resulted in a liberal 
utopia so much as a new era of religious or civilisational conflict (Huntington 
1993, Juergensmeyer 1993).
At the base of the cyclical view of change is a profound belief that one can 
dip into practically any period of international history and find remarkable 
parallels with international relations today. The observations of Thucydides’ 
fourth-century BC History of the Peloponnesian War are much quoted by 
cyclicalists, as are those of his seventeenth-century translator, Thomas Hobbes 
(Lebow 2005). The lessons of history, for the cyclical conception, are that only 
sober study of the recurring patterns of history, and the realistic conduct of 
human affairs according to these patterns, are the best routes to security and 
prosperity. On the other hand, misinformed idealism of the teleological variety 
is the shortest route to instability and violence.
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A view of human nature very different from the optimistic teleological view 
drives cyclical approaches to international affairs. However rational and virtuous 
humans are as individuals or within societies, as collectivities they become 
profoundly amoral (Niebuhr 1948). Whatever their morals or positive intentions, 
they are fated by the international structure of anarchy—whereby there is no 
power higher than the state, so each must look to protect its interests—to think 
and act in a profoundly self-interested way (Wight 1977). Because there is no 
higher authority to prevent predation, conflict and violence are ever present 
possibilities (Waltz 1959). As each state looks to bolster its own security, it 
thereby makes its neighbours less secure, prompting a never-ending ‘security 
dilemma’ that gives rise to high peacetime arms spending (Herz 1950). In such a 
state of nature, states and leaders may profess teleological principles, but these 
are most likely covers or vehicles for their power ambitions (Morgenthau 1948).
It is important to note that the cyclical view is not a theory of stasis; some 
evolution is acknowledged by writers within this tradition. They tend to see 
international history as the serial rise and decline of empires and great powers, 
which structure the world around them to suit their interests and to the 
preferences of their domestic orders and values (Knutsen 1999). Their rise is most 
often the result of material factors: economic dynamism, military technology, 
and/or demographic surges. The period of their ascendancy brings relative 
international peace, prosperity and progress (Kindleberger 1976). Often this 
period is marked by a rough balance between several great powers, the number 
of which determines the structure and stability of the international system at 
the time (Waltz 1979). But inevitably this period comes to an end, either due 
to the rise of competitors (Organski 1958) or because of the internal strains of 
maintaining hegemony (Kennedy 1988). The period of power transition, from 
one order to the next, is generally marked by great power war (Gilpin 1984).
Drawing inspiration from Machiavelli, cyclicalists believe the role of international 
relations is to provide clear policy advice on the current and future state of the 
cycle of history. It is their job to defuse any form of triumphalism, in which great 
powers can become convinced that history has ended with their ascendancy, and 
will stay that way (Layne 2003). By being clear-eyed about the inevitable cycle 
of history, they are able to provide policy advice that can minimise the violent 
aspects of power transition. In this sense, they are able to strike the occasional 
optimistic note, pointing to the US’s peaceful usurpation of Britain’s role as a 
world power in the mid-twentieth century, and the Soviet Union’s peaceful 
implosion in the late twentieth century (Gaddis 1997). As such, theirs is not a 
rigidly mechanistic view of change. Surprising variation can occur despite the 
underlying logic remaining constant; as Mark Twain quipped, ‘history seldom 
repeats itself, but it does tend to rhyme.’
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Episodism
A third variant—very much a minority strain—has emerged between the 
absolutes of teleologism and cyclicality. This is a tendency to view change as 
episodic and unpredictable in its timing, extent and direction. It is a conception 
of international relations as a realm of human activity that tends towards 
routines and stasis, accreting over time structures and forces of inertia that 
are periodically overwhelmed by underlying change. It is an approach that 
remains unconvinced by the unidirectional optimism of the teleologists or the 
determining pessimism of the cyclicalists. It is unconvinced by the data of both 
schools, preferring to remain open-minded and empirically oriented in thinking 
about change in international relations.
A major element in the inertia of contemporary international relations is seen to 
be the increasing routinisation of international life. The remarkable proliferation 
of international institutions has been a major part of this. International 
institutions, it is argued, preserve the power structures and expectations that 
existed at the time of their establishment. This makes them extremely hard to 
adapt to the evolution of international relations, and equally hard to abolish, 
given the reputation capital and hopes that have been invested in them over the 
years. The solution to the declining relevance of existing institutions is rather 
to simply establish new ones—which turn out to be equally inflexible and of 
declining relevance over time. The result of constant institutional creation is a 
progressive crowding of diplomatic schedules and a growing routinisation of 
international life—at the expense of issues on which real initiative and action is 
needed (Wesley 2011). 
Inertia is the result of the difficulty and cost of change and the investment of 
the powerful in current ways of doing things. Several factors play interlocking 
roles in supporting inertia and routinisation. Institutions and relationships 
often embody high start-up and sunk costs. Often they were negotiated at an 
opportune time that is unlikely to recur; inevitably they are seen, for all of their 
defects, as being better than no institution, agreement or relationship at all. 
Existing institutions exert strong learning effects, by favouring those who adapt 
their strategies and expectations to the existing rules. These are buttressed by 
adaptive expectations that favour existing ways of doing things over innovation. 
Bureaucratic objectives tend to be moulded by institutional possibilities, 
rather than vice versa. Routinisation incentives tend to multiply activities that 
comply with existing structures and crowd out opportunities for innovation. 
Competency traps breed familiarity with existing rules and bureaucratic training 
becomes oriented to most effectively using those rules (March and Olsen 1998).
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The very anarchic nature of international relations means that established 
routines and institutions are heavily invested in, simply because they enable 
inter-state and intercultural interaction. Often such institutions are modes 
of communication (the dominant lingua franca) or transaction (the dominant 
international currency) that exhibit remarkable ‘sticky power’ simply because 
of their usefulness and the lack of viable alternatives (Mead 2004, Eichengreen 
2009). Often their usefulness hides considerable weaknesses.
Ultimately, however, change will occur because humanity is subject to constant 
change: material, technical, developmental, moral. Eventually the sum of all 
of this underlying change will expose the inadequacies of existing routines, 
institutions and relationships. Europe’s empires will collapse in the space of a 
decade. A Berlin Wall will be torn down overnight. Two planes will crash into 
the World Trade Centre. Depending on the gap that is drawn between existing 
routines and the new reality, a period of intense experimentation will follow—
and the resulting routines, institutions and relationships will soon accrete all of 
the attributes of inertia.
Episodic change cannot be categorically classified as either teleological or 
cyclical. One instance—the fall of the Berlin Wall—may look like evidence of 
teleological progress, while another—the attack on the World Trade Centre—
may be redolent with the rhymes of history.
Conclusion
Change remains a central problem in the discipline of international relations. 
As  an intellectual exercise and a policy science, international relations is 
inescapably future-focused. Conditioned to the constant expectation of 
unforeseen developments, its reaction has been to study change in history as a 
way of projecting some predictability into the future. But the divides between 
its three perspectives on change—teleologism, cyclicality and episodism—
are ultimately unresolvable. There is, quite simply, enough data to support 
each of these three positions. No event has yet enabled any of the variants to 
permanently discredit one of the others. And so international relations will 
continue to be a discipline united by its deeply divided conceptions of change.
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